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FEDERAL CIRCUIT EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE 
PATENT JURISDICTION: A RESPONSE TO CHIEF 
JUDGE WOOD 
 
Harold C. Wegner* 
 
I. OVERVIEW 
In her keynote address last year at the Supreme Court Intellectual 
Property Review conference held at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, Chief 
Judge Diane P. Wood launched a frontal assault on the exclusive appellate 
patent jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.1 The Chief Judge raised the flag: 
Congress should divest the Federal Circuit of its exclusive appellate patent 
jurisdiction. Nobody saluted. There has been no movement in Congress to 
legislatively adopt her proposal. 
Yet, her proposal raises serious questions and deserves thoughtful 
consideration. For the past several years there has been debate in academic 
circles as to whether the Federal Circuit should be divested of its exclusive 
appellate patent jurisdiction.2 Given the prominence of the Chief Judge and her 
background in academic circles, her views are worthy of detailed discussion. To 
be sure, there has been significant academic support for changing the ground 
rules,3 and there has indeed been a longstanding history of opposition to 
specialized courts.4 
A driving force behind the creation of the Federal Circuit was a desire by 
the business community to have uniform patent justice throughout the country.5 
On the other hand, one of the major arguments favoring plural appellate routes is 
that conflicting viewpoints will percolate up to the Supreme Court which will 
then resolve the issue.6 Yet, in the areas of high technology obviousness case 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Harold C. Wegner. Former Director of the Intellectual Property 
Law Program and Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; 
currently, partner, Foley & Lardner LLP. The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any colleague, organization, or 
client thereof. 
 1 Hon. Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive 
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL PROP. 1 (2014). 
 2 See infra Part II. 
 3 See infra Part II.B. 
 4 See Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 
1755 (1997). 
 5 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981). 
 6 See Wood, supra note 1, at 4; infra Part V. 
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law where uniformity is needed most, the Court has for more than sixty years 
been reluctant to grant review.7 
Professor John Fitzgerald Duffy of the University of Virginia has been 
one of the key leaders of the movement to divest the Federal Circuit of exclusive 
appellate patent jurisdiction. Professor Duffy also was counsel for petitioner in 
the KSR case where he argued about the failure of the Court to grant review in 
patent cases.8 
While this paper focuses upon the bread and butter issue of 
nonobviousness and the virtual absence of Supreme Court review in the entire 
history of the Federal Circuit, the same story applies for a variety of other issues 
where the Court rarely, if ever, has granted review.9 
While academics may relish the opportunity to write about inter-circuit 
splits, the uncertainty that would be created by the failure of the Court to grant 
review would create unacceptable business uncertainty.10 
II. VIEWS SUPPORTING THE WOOD POSITION 
A. A View from the Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit 
In her keynote address on September 26, 2013, Chief Judge Diane Wood 
reopened the debate started by Professor Duffy several years ago as to whether 
the exclusive patent appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit should be 
reconsidered.11 Sub silentio adopting the Duffy view, the Chief Judge would 
provide patent appellants a choice between the Federal and a regional Circuit.12 
A look at the contemporary writings of Duffy and others would suggest that her 
views merely follow others. Yet, that is indeed not the case: her own thinking 
goes back nearly a full generation.13 
The Chief Judge also is not a patent neophyte. Her exposure to patent 
cases dates back nearly forty years to 1976 when she was a law clerk at the Fifth 
Circuit where her judge authored the patent opinion, Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. 
California-Florida Plant Corp.14 
  
 7 See infra Part V.A. 
 8 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 
(2007) (No. 04-1350), 2005 WL 835463. 
 9 See infra Part VI. 
 10 See infra Part VII. 
 11 Wood, supra note 1; Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. L. REV. 1619 (2007). 
 12 See Wood, supra note 1. 
 13 See Wood, supra note 4. 
 14 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J.). 
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B. The Academic Chorus of Support 
Professor Gugliuzza has once again pointed the finger at the Federal 
Circuit: “If patent law’s problems can be traced in significant part to the Federal 
Circuit, the natural question for patent scholars is: what has caused this 
disconnect between the court’s patent jurisprudence and the needs of 
innovators?”15 Citing Professors Bessen, Meurer, Nard, Duffy, Rai, Jaffe, and 
Lerner, he states: “Many scholars have attributed the problem to the court’s 
status as the practically exclusive appellate forum for patent cases.”16 
Led by Professor Duffy, there is significant scholarship within academic 
circles that puts the blame on the exclusive jurisdiction for patents that is 
enjoyed by the Federal Circuit: “A common argument is that the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction leads to poor percolation of legal ideas, less 
experimentation with legal principles, and, ultimately, a patent law that, 
although uniform, is insular and severed from economic reality.”17 
III. GENERALIST COURTS: A DIVERSITY OF CIRCUIT VIEWPOINTS 
The Chief Judge has had a longstanding opposition to specialized 
tribunals:  
[P]owerful arguments against fundamentally changing the role of the 
Article III judge . . . exist. In my view, the strongest one relates to the 
accountability of the courts to the rest of society. Generalist judges cannot 
become technocrats; they cannot hide behind specialized vocabulary and 
“insider” concerns. The need to explain even the most complex area to the 
generalist judge (and often to a jury as well) forces the bar to demystify 
legal doctrine and to make the law comprehensible. This creates obvious 
benefits for clients as well as courts, since in today’s skeptical world 
clients are not likely to warm to the “trust me, I know what is best for you” 
explanation either.18 
  
 15 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 
1441 (2012). 
 16 Id. (citing JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 227–31 (2008); Nard & Duffy, 
supra note 11, at 1619 (2007); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1122–27 
(2003); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 96–126 (2004) (characterized as “arguing that the creation of the Federal 
Circuit led to a broadening of patent-holders’ rights, which in turn has led to ‘waste and 
uncertainty that hinders and threatens the innovative process’”). 
 17 Id. at 1442 (citing BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 16; Nard & Duffy, supra note 
11, at 1622). 
 18 Wood, supra note 4, at 1767. 
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For the purposes of the present discussion, one may assume, arguendo, 
that all of the various benefits of shared appellate routes are true, particularly 
that the percolation of differing views amongst the several circuits will help 
shape issues for Supreme Court grant of certiorari and ultimate resolution. Yet, 
the unstated premise of both Professor Duffy’s and the Chief Judge’s arguments 
is that when issues become clearly identified as ripe for grant of certiorari, the 
Supreme Court will grant review to resolve and shape the issues which have 
been painted through conflicting circuit court opinions. 
IV. PATENT LAW UNIFORMITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY 
Undoubtedly the most important benefit of the exclusive patent 
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit has been the predictability of a uniform result 
no matter which trial court was selected. Under the old regime, a patent 
challenged in St. Louis was likely to be held invalid for want of “invention” 
(obviousness) whereas a lawsuit across the Mississippi River in Illinois could 
yield the opposite result, all based upon whether the appellate review was to the 
most anti-patent circuit in the United States—the Eighth Circuit—or in one of 
the more moderate fora—the Seventh Circuit. 
Appellate forum shopping came to an end with the creation of the Federal 
Circuit: 
[Prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit], the law diverged among 
regions of the country. Some circuits imposed difficult burdens on 
patentees, or light ones on infringers. Statistics demonstrate that in the 
period 1945-1957, a patent was twice as likely to be held valid and 
infringed in the Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four 
times more likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the Second 
Circuit. It is no wonder that forum shopping was rampant, and that a 
request to transfer a patent infringement action from Texas, in the Fifth 
Circuit, to Illinois, in the Seventh Circuit, would be bitterly fought in both 
circuits and, ultimately, in the Supreme Court. Furthermore, without 
knowing where a patent would be litigated, it became impossible to 
adequately counsel technology developers or users. In such a legal 
environment, the promise of a patent could hardly be considered sufficient 
incentive to invest in research and development.” 
 
The [Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 creating the Federal 
Circuit] offered a solution to these problems by creating a single forum to 
hear appeals from most patent disputes. According to proponents of the 
legislation, channeling patent cases into a single appellate forum would 
create a stable, uniform law and would eliminate forum shopping. Greater 
certainty and predictability would foster technological growth and 
industrial innovation and would facilitate business planning. In addition, 
proponents hoped that the new court would alleviate the workload crisis, at 
least at the appellate level, where the technical nature of patent disputes 
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required a disproportionate amount of time from the generalist judges of 
the regional circuits.19 
V. PREMISE OF SUPREME COURT GRANT OF CERTIORARI 
A. Paucity of High Technology Obviousness Cases 
Beginning with the time when the Federal Circuit was established in 
1982, there was an early reluctance to grant review of Federal Circuit patent 
cases. Nearly fourteen full years later, the Supreme Court handed down 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,20 the first major substantive patent law 
case from the Federal Circuit with a merits decision on a matter of substantive 
patent law.21 
Recently, there have been several patent cases heard by the Supreme 
Court, but the models suggested by Professor Duffy and the Chief Judge are 
theoretically sound only if the premise is correct that the Supreme Court will 
grant certiorari to review conflicts in patent cases on major issues of substantive 
patent law such as nonobviousness. The premise is dubious at best when the 
focus is upon the substantive hard core patent issues relating to patent validity 
and, particularly, to the bottom line consideration in a majority of cases, the 
issue of statutory nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
Given the track record of the Supreme Court dating back to the 
commencement of practice under the 1952 Patent Act, there is little assurance 
that the Court would grant certiorari to resolve inter-circuit conflicts of 
substantive patent law. If there is divided appellate jurisdiction, there is no 
assurance of any kind (apart from the slowing down of the certiorari process to 
await for inter-circuit conflicts to arise) that the Court would grant certiorari in 
many, or any, high technology cases where a high technology issue is at stake. 
Since the 1952 Patent Act—a period that involves thirty years of patent 
appeals to the regional circuits and thirty years under the Federal Circuit 
regime—the Court has been loathe to grant certiorari to determine 
nonobviousness in any case involving a high technology invention where the 
technology was the focus of the inquiry. In the few cases dealing with 
  
 19 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
 20 517 U.S. 370 (1966). 
 21 Cf. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (GVR to apply FRCP 
Rule 52(a)); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) 
(jurisdictional issue); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (statutory 
construction of the scope of 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1)); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993) (vacatur); Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. 
Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27 (1993) (dismissed after argument on the basis of an 
improvident grant of certiorari); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995) 
(Plant Variety Protection Act). 
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nonobviousness where review has been granted, the Supreme Court has shied 
away from any recent review of issues requiring knowledge of high technology. 
Since Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.22 in 1976, the Court has issued an opinion on 
whether an invention is nonobvious only in KSR, the “gas pedal” case.23 KSR 
involved no new technology at all, but rather determined whether a combination 
of old elements should be put together to create an electronic gas pedal.24 
Sakraida itself also was hardly high tech; the case dealt with the “technology” 
for flushing cow manure from barns.25 The Court equated the invention to the 
mythical Hercules flushing the Aegean stables.26 
KSR stands alone as the only Supreme Court review in the era of the 
Federal Circuit of an issue of nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
B. The Duffy Premise is Contradicted by the Duffy Petition 
The premise of Professor Duffy’s and Chief Judge Wood’s argument is 
that with a diversity of appellate decisions blossoming forth from competing 
circuits, such conflict will encourage Supreme Court review of patent cases 
where clear differences emerge between the several circuits. However, this has 
not been true for obviousness cases. 
For example, Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,27 was decided in the first 
full year of existence of the Federal Circuit and just seven years after Sakraida. 
Here, the Federal Circuit sub silentio but clearly repudiated the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Sakraida.28 The Court left Stratoflex standing for nearly thirty years 
until it granted review in KSR. 
The KSR petition (coauthored by Professor Duffy) stated that: 
The [KSR] decision below is in direct conflict with this Court’s precedents, 
the law of at least seven (7) regional Circuits, and the text of § 103 itself. 
The divergence between this Court’s precedents and existing Federal 
Circuit precedent is so blatant that commentators and casebook editors in 
the field of patent law routinely describe the Federal Circuit’s precedents 
on § 103 as “abolish[ing],” “ignor[ing],” or “dismissing” controlling 
Supreme Court precedent. 
. . . . 
  
 22 425 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 23 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Sakraida, 425 U.S. 273. 
 26 Id. at 275 n.1. 
 27 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.). 
 28 Id. at 1566. See Kevin Rhodes, The Federal Circuit’s Patent Nonobviousness 
Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 
1051, 1061–65 (1991) for more information on the obvious standards adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Sakraida and the Federal Circuit in Stratoflex. 
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Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, at least seven (7) of the 
regional Courts of Appeals had cited and followed Sakraida, Anderson’s-
Black Rock, and their many predecessor cases, when analyzing the validity 
of combination patent claims such as the patent claim at issue in this 
case.29 
Thanks to a new statutory scheme for patent law that has been in effect 
for applications filed since March 16, 2013, the courts have a multitude of issues 
that will present cases of first impression. Even if the Federal Circuit retains 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction, it will be some time before patent applications 
percolate through the examination system to be granted patents and eventually 
find their way into the court system. Consider, for example, the statutory test for 
nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, the very first 
statutory test replacing the case law doctrine of “invention” dating back more 
than a century earlier to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.30 Despite the fact that 
nonobviousness was an issue in the vast majority of all patent trials, it took 
fourteen years for the Supreme Court to issue its first opinion interpreting the 
new statutory enactment in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City31 In the 
eleven-year stretch between Graham and Sakraida there were only two further 
decisions on nonobviousness.32 Since KSR in 2007, there has yet to be another 
review of nonobviousness. 
VI. GENERAL ABDICATION OF APPELLATE PATENT REVIEW 
The stark failure of the Court to review more than one nonobviousness 
case in the thirty plus years of the existence of the Federal Circuit speaks for 
itself. 
Yet another example is the important issue of particularity in claiming 
under the Leahy Smith America Invents Act,33 codified as 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), 
but which has existed under different statutory labels since the nineteenth 
century. Whether under the Federal Circuit or the prior era with the possibility 
of inter-circuit splits, until this year the Court had never granted review of the 
issue of whether a claim particularly points out and distinctly claims the 
invention as mandated by § 112(b) since World War II. 
  
 29 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at *11–12, *15 (footnote omitted). 
 30 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
 31 383 U.S. 1 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 32 Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v, Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Dann 
v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976). 
 33 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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This year, for the first time in modern history, the Court reviewed the 
issue in Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.34 Nautilus reawakens the ghost 
of United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,35 the last major Supreme Court 
case where claims were invalidated for indefiniteness under what today is 35 
U.S.C. § 112(b).36 
VII. AN ACADEMICS DELIGHT, BUSINESSMAN’S FRIGHT 
The Duffy proposal has received discussion largely within academic 
circles. To be sure, a split appellate route for patents would be an academic’s 
dream come true as academics would have a field day presenting the ideas of 
economists and legal scholars.37 It is perfectly understandable that academics are 
delighted with the proposals of the Chief Judge and Professor Duffy. Nothing 
fuels academic interest more than inter-circuit splits. 
But what about business certainty? The Chief Judge acknowledges that 
“[t]he greatest pressure to move toward specialization appears to be coming 
from the business community, which would like faster justice for itself, but who 
does not want that?”38 Indeed, this is precisely what has been fostered through 
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction given to the Federal Circuit for patent cases. 
CONCLUSION 
While the premise of Professor Duffy’s and Chief Judge Wood’s 
argument that a diversity of appellate decisions from competing circuits will 
encourage Supreme Court review of patent is sound, given the track record of 
the Supreme Court over the past generations both pre- and post-Federal Circuit, 
it is difficult to expect significant grants of certiorari to resolve inter-circuit 
conflicts over high technology issues. 
  
 34 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (holding that “a 
patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification 
delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable 
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention). 
 35 317 U.S. 228 (1942). 
 36 Arguably, one could also consider the issues as part of a case from sixty-eight years 
ago, Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946) (citing United 
Carbon, 317 U.S. at 236). 
 37 Nard & Duffy, supra note 11, at 1649 (“Without the benefits of competition and 
diversity, the Federal Circuit is isolated from noteworthy doctrinal proposals and 
normative prescriptions that would be generated by other circuit courts, and is less likely 
to be presented with or to entertain ideas articulated by economists, legal scholars, and 
other judges. And it is at the appellate level where these proposals and prescriptions can 
make the most pronounced difference.”) (footnote omitted). 
 38 Wood, supra note 4, at 1768. 
